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NOTES
SHAME ON YOU: AN ANALYSIS OF MODERN SHAME
PUNISHMENT AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO INCARCERATION
Cursed is the ground because of you; In toil you shall eat of it
All the days of your life.... Then the Lord God said, "Be-
hold, the man has become like one of Us, knowing good and
evil; and now,- lest he stretch out his hand, and take also
from the tree of life, and eat, and live forever"--therefore the
Lord God sent him out from the garden of Eden, to cultivate
the ground from which he was taken.'
Daniel Alvin stood before Georgia State Court Judge Leon M.
Braun, Jr., to receive his sentence after being convicted of eight
counts of theft.2 Alvin, husband to a pregnant wife and father of
disabled eight-year-old twins, convinced eight victims to hand
over money for Atlanta Hawks basketball tickets and a charter
bus ride to the game.3 The tickets and the bus ride never mate-
1. Genesis 3:17, 22-23 (Ryrie Study). This act of casting Adam and Eve out of
the garden of Eden served a number of symbolic purposes. First, evicting Adam and
Eve after they had eaten the fruit of the forbidden tree was an act of punishment.
See id. at 3:17. It also was an act of mercy, allowing Adam and Eve to escape an
eternal life in a state of alienation and death. See i&L at 3:22-24. Additionally, it
was an act of shaming. After eating the fruit, Adam and Eve recognized that they
were not clothed and were ashamed. See id at 3:7. Once they were clothed, God
subjected the couple to shame of a greater magnitude by casting them out of the
garden of Eden and forcing them both to recognize the extent of their sins and to
begin a life, however mortal, of goodness, repentance, and eventual salvation. See i&
at 3:24. For an excellent compilation of essays discussing religious interpretations of
repentance and forgiveness, see REPENTANCE: A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE (Amitai
Etzioni & David E. Carney eds., 1997).
2. See Ann Woolner, Shame as Punishment; Common in Early America, It's Mak-
ing a Comeback, FULTON COUNTY DAILY REP., Oct. 6, 1997, at 1, available in
LEXIS, News Library, Papers File.
3. See id.
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rialized.' The police did, however, and charged Alvin with theft
by taking.5
Judge Braun decided to offer Alvin a choice: he could spend
six months behind bars, or he could spend five weekends in jail
and walk around the Fulton County Courthouse for a total of
thirty hours wearing a sign that read "I AM A CONVICTED
THIEF."6 Alvin chose the second option and dutifully carried his
sign around the courthouse to the honks and cries of passersby.7
Although the sentence caused Alvin significant embarrassment
in his community, he spent minimal time in jail, and his family
stayed together.'
Judge Braun's decision to offer Alvin an alternative to incar-
ceration represents a growing trend among sentencing judges s
Frustrated with the ineffectiveness of traditional forms of pun-
ishment, judges are imposing sentences of shame upon convicted
criminals more frequently.10 Ranging from the mundane to the
Byzantine, such sentences are not without controversy.
Professor Dan Kahan, a supporter of shame punishment, be-
lieves that "[sihaming is a potentially cost-effective, politically
popular method of punishment" that will enjoy future success
because people "want[] more from criminal punishment. They
want a message. They want moral condemnation of the offend-
er."" On the other side of the debate, Mark Kappelhoff of the
American Civil Liberties Union criticizes shame punishment as
4. See id
5. See id.
6. See id The sandwich board-type sign that the court required Alvin to wear
over his shoulders had easily readable lettering on the front and back. See id.
7. See id.
8. See i. For Alvin, the choice between jail and family was clear, and well
worth the humiliation. See id. In response to the jeers of commuters and pedestri-
ans, Alvin stated: "It can't last forever." Id.
9. See id.
10. See id. Many judges do not consider shame-type punishments to be a form of
punishment at all. See id Rather, judges impose shaming as probation with the idea
that the shaming will rehabilitate the convict, and thus fulfill the stated goal of pro-
bation. See id As this Note will argue, judges improperly label shame punishments
as probation, thereby subjecting appeals of shame punishment conditions to an im-
proper standard of review. This standard dooms many creative alternatives to prison.
11. Tony Allen-Mills, American Criminals Sentenced to Shame, SUNDAY TIMES
(London), Apr. 20, 1997, at 23.
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"[glratuitous humiliation of the individual [that] serves no soci-
etal purpose at all." Mr. Kappelhoff adds that "there's been no
research to suggest [that] it's been effective in reducing crime."13
While the issues are far from settled, there is no doubt that
shame is receiving national attention. 4
This Note discusses and analyzes the modern reemergence of
shame punishment as an alternative to traditional sentencing
practices and explores appellate court treatment of shaming cas-
es. This Note suggests that judges who incorporate shame into
their judicial arsenal as a form of probation, rather than punish-
ment, do so erroneously. Consequently, when offenders appeal
these shame-probation conditions, appellate courts subject them
to a standard of judicial discretion rather than a more appropri-
ate and-more deferential standard of "cruel and unusual punish-
ment" under the Eighth Amendment.15 Application of the judi-
12. Id-
13. Id. Mr. Kappelhoff is correct in asserting that there is little existing empirical
evidence that actually proves that shaming punishment reduces crime rates. Al-
though this lack of evidence is a stumbling block for shame advocates, there is sig-
nificant circumstantial evidence that shaming, in certain circumstances, is an effec-
tive tool in the fight against crime. See infra note 173; see also text accompanying
notes 135-55 (providing a further discussion of this evidence). For a well-written ar-
gument against the imposition of shame punishments, see James Q. Whitman, What
is Wrong with Inflicting Shame Sanctions?, 107 YALE L.J. 1055 (1998). Professor
Whitman, in an eloquent and well-researched essay, argues that shame punishments,
while superficially effective, violate the dignity of the offender. See id at 1060. His
article renouncing shame punishment is firmly grounded and discusses important
issues; however, such a condemnation of the use of shame by U.S. courts warrants a
balanced retort. See infra notes 122-34 and accompanying text (discussing the consti-
tutionality of shame punishment).
As this Note will show, shame punishment is a potentially attractive solution to
a fiscally strapped and increasingly ineffective and dangerous prison system. Fur-
thermore, it is likely that the public would embrace shame punishment as an alter-
native to incarceration. Although shame punishment is not a foolproof solution, if it
were instituted within certain guidelines, it would prove a viable alternative to the
degrading and brutalistic system of incarceration currently in use in the United
States.
14. See Richard Cohen, The Shame Enforcer, WASH. POST, Oct. 20, 1998, at A19
(discussing shaming of President Clinton). Cohen quotes Colin Powell and Bob Dole
as advocating the restoration of a sense of shame for wrongdoers. See i&.
15. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. It is important to note here that the focus of this
discussion is on shame punishment of convicted criminals. This Note will not ad-
dress the growing, and admittedly problematic, phenomenon of broadcasting or pub-
lishing the names of arrested, but not convicted, suspects of crimes such as shoplifting
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cial discretion standard leads appellate courts to find that im-
position of shame-probation violates the fundamental goal of
probation-rehabilitation of the offender. 6 The appellate court
then reverses the lower court's shame-probation sentence, and
the offender either enters the traditional probation system or
must serve a jail sentence. Alternatively, judges could impose
shame as a punishment, but many state sentencing guidelines
do not provide them with the latitude necessary to justify such
sentences. 1'7 This Note argues that if shaming is to succeed, leg-
islatures must alter the statutory limits of punishment to in-
clude a shaming option.
The secondary purpose of this Note is to evaluate the efficacy
of shaming as a form of punishment. Virtually no empirical data
exists detailing the effectiveness of shaming in deterring crime
and reducing recidivism rates; however, ample data suggests
that current forms of sentencing are ineffective in punishing
and/or rehabilitating criminals.'" Moreover, the majority of of-
fenders in the prison system today are nonviolent drug offenders
who would benefit from an alternative form of punishment.'"
Currently, nonviolent offenders are sent to prison where, like
other prisoners, they are subject to brutalization. ° Upon release,
they are typically disenfranchised, deemed inferior citizens by
their peers and potential employers,2' and, in many circumstances,
and solicitation of prostitution. See, e.g., Equal Time (CNBC television broadcast,
July 10, 1997), available in LEXIS, News Library, Transcripts File; Laura Sessions
Stepp, Neighbor Watch, WASH. POST, Nov. 25, 1994, at B5; Talk Back Live (CNN
television broadcast, July 13, 1995), available in LEXIS, News Library, Transcripts
File; Edward Walsh, Kansas City Tunes in as New Program Aims at Sex Trade:
'John TV,' WASH. POST, July 8, 1997, at A3.
16. See People v. Meyer, 680 N.E.2d 315, 318 (Ill. 1997) (stating that the purpose
of probation is to rehabilitate the offender).
17. See id. at 319.
18. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF
CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS-1996 118 tbl.2.9 [hereinafter SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL
JUSTICE STATISTICS].
19. See id
20. See generally The Prison Discipline Study: Exposing the Myth of Humane Im-
prisonment in the United States, in CRIMINAL INJUSTICE: CONFRONTING THE PRISON
CRISIS 92 (Ellhu Rosenblatt ed., 1996) (describing the condition of American prisons
and the abuse and neglect faced by both violent and nonviolent prisoners) [hereinaf-
ter CRIMINAL INJUSTICE].
21. See Alexander C. Lichtenstein & Michael A. Kroll, The Economic Role of the
656 [Vol. 40:653
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they see no alternative but to return to a life of crime.22 Such a
narrow-minded formulation of punishment by the criminal jus-
tice system is outdated and serves only to make more hardened
and violent criminals. This Note maintains that, in light of the
current violent and overcrowded atmosphere of American pris-
ons, shaming constitutes an efficient, fiscally sound, and creative
form of sentencing that can have positive deterrent effects and
reduce recidivism rates.
The first section of this Note discusses the evolution of sham-
ing in the American criminal justice system. It also discusses
why shaming, as it is imposed today, should be classified as
punishment in light of the goals of probation as opposed to the
goals of punishment. The second section briefly explores several
principal cases recently decided by state appellate courts that
involved shaming. The third section sets forth the rationale for
applying an Eighth Amendment standard of review to shame
punishment, and argues that shame punishments meet this
standard. A focal point of this section analogizes shame punish-
ment with the more severe, and controversial, corporal punish-
ment. The section concludes that corporal punishment, while ex-
tremely unlikely to reemerge as an acceptable form of punish-
ment, would indeed pass the cruel and unusual standard im-
posed by the Eighth Amendment.
The fourth section explores the efficacy of shaming. This dis-
cussion focuses on the psychological aspects of shaming and
whether it deserves a place in the American criminal justice sys-
tem. The fifth section of this Note provides an analysis of the
need for shaming given the current overcrowding in prisons, the
shrinking number of prisons, and increasingly tight law en-
forcement budgets. The sixth section concludes with a discussion
of the future of shaming. This section suggests several limita-
tions on the substance and imposition of shame punishment to
ensure that judges impose these types of punishments on indi-
viduals for whom shaming has the greatest potential advan-
tages.
U.S. Prison System, in CRIMINAL INJUSTICE, supra note 20, at 16, 26-27.
22. See id
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THE EVOLUTION OF SHAME
As the opening quotation of this Note indicates, the notion of
shame is a fundamental aspect of human existence.23 It is no
surprise, therefore, that early forms of punishment focused on
the idea of shame. Imposition of shame punishment can be
traced back to the dawn of civilization.2 In its earliest forms,
shame punishment was based on one's essential attachment to
society and civilization. Tribes, communities, and villages were
essential to life. Indeed, in early times, the community was syn-
onymous with life itself.2 6 One of the harshest forms of punish-
ment was banishment from one's community." Such punishment
ensured a life of hardship or, perhaps, death.2"
Shaming continued to evolve throughout Europe with the in-
vention of bizarre and horrifying methods of public torture that
typically ended in the death of the accused. 29 These methods
traveled to America where, thankfully, they became less brutal,
23. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
24. See JOHN BRAiTHWAITE, CRIME, SHAME AND REINTEGRATION 57 (1989).
25. See generally HARRY ELMER BARNES, THE STORY OF PUNISHMENT: A RECORD
OF MAN's INHUMANITY TO MAN 43 (1930) (discussing primitive forms of shame pun-
ishment in tribal communities).
26. See id at 45 (stating that in tribal society the unitary group was not the
family but the whole clan or village).
27. See idi at 39, 43 (noting that primitive societies wiped out sin by wiping out
the sinner).
28. See generally iL at 43-44 (describing both physical and mental punishments
endured by criminals in primitive societies).
29. See MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON 1-5
(Alan Sheridan trans., 1977). As an example of the unspeakable punishments in-
flicted on the accused, consider the following account:
On 2 March 1757 Damiens the regicide [king-killer] was condemned
"to make the amende honorable before the main door of the Church of
Paris", where he was to be "taken and conveyed in a cart, wearing noth-
ing but a shirt, holding a torch of burning wax weighing two pounds";
then, "in the said cart, to the Place de Grave, where, on a scaffold that
will be erected there, the flesh will be torn from his breasts, arms,
thighs and calves with red-hot pincers, his right hand, holding the knife
with which he committed the said parricide, burnt with sulphur, and, on
those places where the flesh will be torn away, poured molten lead, boil-
ing oil, burning resin, wax and sulphur melted together and then his
body drawn and quartered by four horses and his limbs and body con-
sumed by fire, reduced to ashes, and his ashes thrown to the winds."
Id- at 3.
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but no less humiliating. For relatively minor offenses, a citizen
received an admonition-he appeared before a magistrate to be
publicly and formally denounced.30 More serious offenders were
sent to the pillory or stocks.3 ' The most egregious offenders faced
the brutish shaming ritual of branding or mutilation, thus "fix-
ing on [the offenders] an indelible 'mark of infamy' to warn the
community of their criminal propensities."32 For example, in
Williamsburg, Virginia, an individual convicted of thievery was
nailed by the ear to the wooden brace of the pillory for a period
of time that depended upon the seriousness of his offense.3" Af-
ter the offender served his sentence, the authorities ripped him
from the pillory without first removing the nail. 4 The individual
was thus "ear-marked" as a criminal offender for the remainder
of his life.
Gradually, this "gloomy festival of punishment" 5 began to lose
favor as America became a more progressive society. 6 Punish-
ment evolved from the physical to the psychological, as citizens
and legislators began to embrace the philosophy of institu-
tionalized punishment.37 As Americans moved westward, settlers
realized the effectiveness of jails and prisons for housing soci-
30. See ADAM JAY HIRSCH, THE RISE OF THE PENITENTIARY: PRISONS AND PUNISH-
iENT IN EARLY AMERICA 3-5 (1992).
31. The pillory was a device that restrained the criminal's head and hands be-
tween two boards. See idt at 5. The stocks restrained the criminal's head and feet.
See id Typically, the pillory and stocks were placed in a very public area of the
town or village so that the criminal was subject to the most severe embarrassment.
See id In Colonial Williamsburg, Virginia, models of these devices are located out-
side the restored courthouse. Long abandoned as a form of punishment, they now
serve as a favorite photo opportunity for tourists.
32. Id Such punishment by "marking" is familiar to many through the character
of Hester Prynne, marked with a scarlet "A" for adulteress, in Nathanial
Hawthorne's 1850 novel The Scarlet Letter.
33. See Davis Y. Paschall, Crime and Its Punishment in Colonial Virginia 1607-
1776 30, 38 (1937) (unpublished MA. thesis, College of William and Mary) (on file
with the College of William and Mary Library).
34. See id.
35. FOUCAULT, supra note 29, at 8.
36. See iaL
37. For an account of the philosophy that gave rise to the modern penitentiary
system, see generally HIRSCH, supra note 30, at 3-68 (discussing America's gradual
shift to institutional incarceration rather than physical punishment).
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ety's offenders.3 8 The efficacy of shaming began to wane as soci-
ety became more mobile.39 America was expanding rapidly, and
individuals were no longer confined to their town or village.4 ° As
a consequence, a criminal shamed in one community could easily
pick up and move to another and enjoy a fresh start.41 By the
dawn of the twentieth century, many courts had rejected shame
as a useful form of punishment.42 Shame then experienced a pe-
riod of dormancy until the late twentieth century, when it en-
joyed a creative renaissance in a more enlightened form.
CASE ANALYSIS
Beginning in the mid-1970s, trial judges began to reincorpo-
rate shame into their judicial arsenal.' Sentences incorporating
shame punishment have encountered varying degrees of accep-
tance at the appellate level." The practice of assigning shame-
related punishment to offenders has continued to the present,
with judges developing new methods of punishing criminals
without having to send them to prison. This section first pro-
38. See ic at 6.
39. See Woolner, supra note 2, at 2.
40. See id.
41. The decline of shaming due to geographic expansion at the turn of the century
might seem to lend support to the idea that shaming would be increasingly ineffec-
tive considering the size, mobility, and population of the United States today. This
is, however, not likely. The imposition of shame punishments on criminals today
would have a significant impact on the American criminal justice system. See infra
notes 135-82 and accompanying text.
42. See, e.g., Hobbs v. State, 32 N.E. 1019, 1021 (Ind. 1893) (recognizing that the
use of pillories and stocks constituted cruel and unusual punishment in violation of
the Eighth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution).
43. See icl; People v. McDowell, 130 Cal. Rptr. 839, 843 (Ct. App. 1976). In
McDowell, the trial court required a convicted purse-snatcher to wear taps on his
shoes as a form of probation. The theory was that the taps would ensure that po-
tential victims would hear the perpetrator before he snatched another purse. The
appellate court reversed, holding that the probation condition was too imprecise. See
i&L at 842-43.
44. Compare id& (holding probation requirement that a convicted purse-snatcher
wear taps on his shoes impermissible), with Goldschmitt v. Florida, 490 So. 2d 123
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986) (per curiam) (holding probation requirement that a convict-
ed drunk driver place a bumper sticker on his car that read "CONVICTED D.U.I.-
RESTRICTED LICENSE" permissible because it bore some rational relationship to
the offense).
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vides a sample of the types of shame cases that have reached
the appellate level in several states and explains the decisions in
those cases. These decisions illustrate how courts are attempting
to "shame" criminals into rehabilitation by imposing shame as
an element of probation in sentencing. By doing so, many courts
are positioning themselves for reversal, as higher courts often
determine that imposing such penalties exceeds the scope of the
lower court's power.'5
The Warning Signs
In the 1997 case of People v. Meyer,6 an Illinois trial court
convicted a sixty-two-year-old defendant of aggravated battery
after he struck and kicked another man who came to his farm to
return some borrowed auto parts. At the sentencing hearing,
the court heard evidence of aggravating and mitigating circum-
stances in order to determine the proper punishment."8 After
considering all of the testimony, the lower court judge sentenced
45. In the sections that follow, this Note will suggest that simply sentencing these
criminals to shame punishments, instead of shame probation, will force appellate
courts to apply a different analysis when reviewing the sentences. Courts likely will
uphold shame punishments against cruel and unusual punishment challenges. As
stated in the introduction, however, the imposition of shame punishments should not
be without limits. There are many factors that a judge should take into consider-
ation when deciding to impose a shame punishment. For a discussion of these limi-
tations, see infra notes 183-205 and accompanying text.
46. 680 N.E.2d 315 (Ill. 1997).
47. See id at 316.
48. See id at 316-17. It appeared at trial that the defendant did not take kindly
to people visiting his property. A witness testified at the sentencing hearing that he
had gone to the defendant's farm to collect money owed from two bad checks and
that, after defendant tendered the money, defendant kicked the witness and ordered
him off the farm. See id at 316. A second witness testified that when he went to
the defendant's farm to investigate an insurance claim, the defendant became hostile,
pushed the witness down, and kicked him several times. See ad In an attempt to
provide mitigating circumstances, witnesses also testified that the defendant suffered
from a "major depressive" disorder and that certain stresses could trigger an instant
and violent change in the defendant's behavior. See id Additionally, witnesses testi-
fied that the defendant's mother and wife relied on him for income, that he had a
good reputation in the community, that he was attempting to control his disorder
with medication, and that sending him to prison would cause his family to suffer
unnecessarily. See id at 316-17.
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the defendant to probation instead of prison.4 9 The conditions of
probation included restitution to the victim, payment of a fine,
and, among other things, placement "at each entrance of his
property [ofi a 4' X 8' sign with clearly readable lettering at
least 8" in height reading: 'Warning! A Violent Felon lives here.
Enter at your own Risk!"'5 0
On appeal, the defendant challenged the placement of the sign
as an unreasonable condition of probation, arguing that the
court went beyond the scope of its authority in imposing such a
condition.51 Under Illinois law, probation must "benefit society
by restoring a defendant to useful citizenship, rather than allow-
ing a defendant to become a burden as an habitual offender."52
The defendant in Meyer argued that the Illinois Unified Code of
Corrections prescribed sixteen permissible probation condi-
tions,53 and that the placement of the sign, intended purely to
ridicule, did not fall within any of them.54
The State responded that the sign might very well cause the
defendant some ridicule, but that effect was only incidental to
its primary purpose of protecting the public and rehabilitating
the offender.55 In addition, the State argued that the sign would
constantly remind the defendant of his crime and therefore in-
crease the probability that the defendant would change his con-
duct and refrain from committing violent acts in the future.56
Finally, the State asserted that the court was well within its dis-
cretion when it imposed the innovative probation condition be-
cause it reasonably conformed to the needs of both the defendant
and the public.57
49. See id at 317.
50. Id- (quoting the trial court's supplemental order).
51. See i&.
52. Id- at 318 (citing People v. Lowe, 606 N.E.2d 1167 (IM. 1992); In re G.B., 430
N.E.2d 1096 (Ill. 1981); People v. Molz, 113 N.E.2d 314 (M11. 1953)).
53. See 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/5-6-3(b) (West 1994).
54. See Meyer, 680 N.E.2d at 317. In addition to the 16 permissible probation
conditions, the trial court in its discretion may impose "other reasonable conditions
relating to the nature of the offense or the rehabilitation of the defendant as deter-
mined for each defendant." 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/5-6-3(b).
55. See Meyer, 680 N.E.2d at 317.
56. See id at 317-18.
57. See id at 318.
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The Illinois Supreme Court overturned the probation condi-
tion as an abuse of judicial discretion."8 In its decision, the court
relied on Illinois case law and decisions from other states that
cautioned courts against using "unconventional conditions of
supervision, which may have unknown consequences." 9 The
court determined that the placement of the sign would be a form
of public ridicule that would have many "unpredictable or unin-
tended consequences which may be inconsistent with the reha-
bilitative purpose of probation."0 It appears that the court drew
heavily from the definition of probation contained in the Illinois
Unified Code of Corrections. In the middle of the opinion, how-
ever, the court blurred the line between probation and punish-
ment, stating that "[pirobation simultaneously serves as a form
of punishment and as a method for rehabilitating an offender."6
In State v. Burdin,"2 the Supreme Court of Tennessee required
a defendant convicted of sexual battery to place a sign in his
front yard notifying the community of the nature of his crime.
58. See id. at 318-20.
59. Id at 319 (citation omitted) (citing similar language in People v. Johnson, 528
N.E.2d 1360 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988)).
60. Id. at 320.
61. Id. at 318 (citing In re G.B., 430 N.E.2d 1096 (Ill. 1981)).
62. 924 S.W.2d 82 (Tenn. 1996). The court in Meyer relied upon this case to sup-
port its findings. See Meyer, 680 N.E.2d at 319.
63. See Burdin, 924 S.W.2d at 84. Note that forcing a convicted sex offender to
post a sign on his front lawn differs from Megan's Law punishments that require a
convicted sex offender to register with the community in which he plans to reside
upon release from prison. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:7-1 to 7-8 (West 1995 &
Supp. 1998). Those punishments are beyond the scope of this Note. Although
Megan's Laws involve some elements of public shame, there are other considerations,
such as right to privacy concerns under the Fourth Amendment, raised in these situ-
ations. See generally Kathieen V. Heaphy, Comment, Megan's Law: Protecting the
Vulnerable or .Unconstitutionally Punishing Sex Offenders?, 7 SETON HALL CONST.
L.J. 913 (1997) (discussing the right to privacy concerns implicated by Megan's Law).
Additionally, requiring a sex offender to post a sign detailing his crime technically is
not a condition of sentencing, but rather a condition imposed by law upon release
from imprisonment. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:7-2. A court may impose such
conditions long after any probationary period has lapsed.
For discussions of Megan's Law and its implications, see generally Nadine
Strossen, Critical Perspectives on Megan's Law: Protection v. Privacy, 13 N.Y.L. SCH.
J. HUA. RTS. 1 (1996) (presenting various perspectives from proponents and oppo-
nents of Megan's Law); Kirsten R. Bredlie, Comment, Keeping Children Out of Dou-
ble Jeopardy: An Assessment of Punishment and Megan's Law in Doe v. Poritz, 81
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In addition to a suspended sentence, as a condition of confine-
ment, the court required the defendant to erect a 4' x 8' sign
reading "Warning, all children. Wayne Burdin is an admitted
and convicted child molester. Parents beware."6' The court man-
dated that the defendant place the sign in the front yard of his
residence where he lived with his mother.6"
The Supreme Court of Tennessee overturned this condition of
parole as beyond the scope of the probation requirements that
trial court judges are permitted to impose.6 6 The court acknowl-
edged that the Tennessee Criminal Sentencing Reform Act of
19896' afforded trial judges "great latitude in formulating pun-
ishment, including the imposition of conditions on probation,"68
but it declined to find that the trial judge was within this lati-
tude in requiring the defendant to post such a sign.6 9 Similar to
the reasoning in Meyer, the court relied on the enumerated con-
ditions in both the Tennessee statute on punishment ° and the
Tennessee statute on probation,"' and found that these statutes
did not give the court permission to impose "'breathtaking' depar-
MINN. L. REv. 501 (1996) (examining the New Jersey Supreme Court's opinion in
Doe v. Poritz, 662 A.2d 367 (N.J. 1995), and its implications); Sheila A. Campbell,
Note, Battling Sex Offenders: Is Megan's Law an Effective Means of Achieving Pub-
lic Safety?, 19 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 519 (1995) (discussing registration and notifica-
tion requirements of New Jersey's Megan's Law and its implication for local law en-
forcement); Alison Virag Greissman, Note, The Fate of "Megan's Law" in New York,
18 CARDozo L. Rsv. 181 (1996) (examining the constitutionality of New York's
Megan's Law and comparing the New York statute to Megan's Laws in other juris-
dictions); Patricia L. Petrucelli, Comment, Megan's Law: Branding the Sex Offender
or Benefitting the Community?, 5 SETON HALL CONsT. L.J. 1127 (1995) (arguing that
community notification laws are constitutional); Mark J. Swearingen, Comment,
Megan's Law as Applied to Juveniles: Protecting Children at the Expense of Chil-
dren?, 7 SETON HALL CONsT. L.J. 525 (1997) (discussing the implications of applying
Megan's Laws to juvenile sex offenders); Brian T. Telpner, Note, Constructing Safe
Communities: Megan's Law and the Purposes of Punishment, 85 GEO. L.J. 2039
(1997) (arguing that Megan's Laws foster social cohesion by exposing undesirable
members of communities).
64. Burdin, 924 S.W.2d at 84.
65. See id
66. See id at 87.
67. TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-35-101 to -504 (1997).
68. Burdin, 924 S.W.2d at 85.
69. See id at 87.
70. TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-35-102(3).
71. See id. § 40-35-303(d).
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tures" from traditional principles of probation. 2 The court justi-
fied its decision by commenting on the unpredictability of such
conditions:
The consequences of imposing such a condition without the
normal safeguards of legislative study and debate are uncer-
tain. Posting the sign in the defendant's yard would dramat-
ically affect persons other than the defendant and those
charged with his supervision. In addition to being novel and
somewhat bizarre, compliance with the condition would have
consequences in the community, perhaps beneficial, perhaps
detrimental, but in any event unforeseen and unpredictable.
Though innovative techniques of probation are encouraged to
promote the rehabilitation of offenders and the prevention of
recidivism, this legislative grant of authority may not be used
to usurp the legislative role of defining the nature of punish-
ment which may be imposed. The power to define what shall
constitute a criminal offense and to assess punishment for a
particular crime is vested in the legislature.73
Drunk Driver Notification
In People v. Letterlough,74 the New York Court of Appeals
struck down a probation condition requiring a convicted drunk
driver to affix a sign to his license plate notifying the public of
his offense.75 In 1991, the State of New York convicted Roy
Letterlough of driving while intoxicated.7 6 It was his sixth con-
viction for an alcohol-related driving offense.7 7 His initial sen-
tence resulted from a plea agreement and included five years of
probation, payment of a $500 fine, and alcohol treatment direct-
ed by the Department of Probation. When Letterlough arrived
for his formal sentencing, the court imposed an additional condi-
72. Burdin, 924 S.W.2d at 86.
73. Id at 87.
74. 655 N.E.2d 146 (N.Y. 1995).
75. See i- at 146.
76. See id. at 147.
77. See id.
78. See id
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tion not stipulated in the prior plea agreement. 9 The court man-
dated that if Letterlough ever reobtained a license during his
five-year probationary period, he would have to affix a sign to
his license plates that read, in fluorescent letters, "convicted
dwi." ° The sentencing judge warned Letterlough that he would
violate probation and face resentencing if he failed to use the
signs.8
The sentencing judge carefully specified that the sign should
be removable so as not to penalize unfairly innocent drivers,
such as family members, who might use the same car as
Letterlough."2 In addition, he articulated a clear rationale for the
unusual probation condition, stating:
79. See id.
80. Id. The trial court was quite particular in prescribing the specifications for
such a sign and its placement on the license plate. The provision stated:
"If for any reason the N.Y. State Department of Motor Vehicles
(DMV) or any other entity, restores full or conditional limited driving
privileges to the Probationer prior to the full expiration of the term of
Probation imposed by this Court, Probationer agrees as follows: He/she
shall order and have installed at his/her sole cost and expense, within
seven (7) days of such license reinstatement, two (2) legible (day and
night) metal, wood, plastic, or other durable and waterproof signs or
plaques, affixed to the top or bottom of both the front and rear license
plate of the vehicle which he/she may be driving (including owned, bor-
rowed, leased, rented, etc.). Said signs shall state in fluorescent, large
block letters 'CONVICTED DWI.' Such signs shall be the full length of
the license plate, and one-half (1/2) the width. Said signs shall be in-
spected and approved by the Probation Department within fourteen (14)
days of such reinstatement, and at any time thereafter: they shall remain
in place for the entire duration of the term of Probation imposed by this
Court. Failure to install them, removal without permission, driving with-
out them, or a police stop for any reason also noting the absence of the
signs, shall be grounds-if proven in court-for a determination of VIO-
LATION OF PROBATION and immediate resentencing."
Id. (quoting the trial court's original order).
81. See id,
82. See id. The trial judge stated:
"I am not requiring that [the sign] be maintained permanently while
others drive that vehicle, only when this individual drives that vehicle
and he may design, should that contingency arise, any sort of a metal
clip system so that it can be removed if anyone else in his family or
friends decide they wish to drive his car with his consent."
Id. (quoting trial court decision).
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"I only wish to warn the public of this and only have this
sign apply to this Defendant.... This gentleman is 54 years
of age and I do not wish to be the one that opens a newspa-
per and sees that this gentleman has caused an accident that
has taken an innocent person's life because I did not do some-
thing that either warns the public or treated his problem. I
hope to be doing both."8 3
In overturning the probation condition, the New York Court of
Appeals distinguished between the goals of punishment and the
goals of probation.8 ' The court of appeals accepted that
Letterlough was an appropriate candidate for probation because
he had a chance at rehabilitation; however, it disagreed with the
means by which the lower court implemented probation.85 The
court of appeals noted that the distinction between rehabilitative
and punitive sanctions admittedly was unclear.86 The court con-
cluded, however, that the New York legislature purposefully ex-
cluded punishment or deterrence from the goals sought to be
achieved by the imposition of probation.87 According to the Court
of Appeals, the sentencing court erred by stating that the goal of
imposing the controversial probation condition was to "warn the
public" of the threat Letterlough posed as a recidivist drunk
driver.8 8 The condition of probation, the court reasoned, could
not be construed as rehabilitative, but rather as simple disclo-
sure of a person's crime, resulting in "humiliation and public
disgrace."' As such, the condition was a form of punishment and
could not qualify as a proper form of probation.0
83. Id (quoting trial court decision) (emphasis added).
84. See iL at 148.
85. See id- at 149.
86. See id.
87. See id. at 148-49.
88. Id. at 149 (quoting trial court decision).
89. Id
90. See id. The court stated: The punitive and deterrent nature of the disputed
'scarlet letter' component of the probationary conditions here overshadows any possi-
ble rehabilitative potential that it may generate and thus is out of step with the
various other devices specifically authorized by [New York penal law]." Id. at 150
(citation omitted).
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Publication of Crime
In the case of Lindsay v. State," the Florida District Court of
Appeals upheld a probation requirement that a convicted drunk
driver place an advertisement in a local newspaper describing
his crime.92 The trial court convicted Charles Lindsay of drunk
driving after he ran into the back of a police patrol car while
drinking beer.93 It was Lindsay's first conviction for drunk driv-
ing, and the sentencing judge intended it to be his last by re-
quiring Lindsay to place his picture in the local paper along
with the details of his offense. 94
Lindsay challenged the ruling on four grounds: (1) the condi-
tion violated the rehabilitative purpose of probation by imposing
an unfair punishment; (2) the penalty bore no relation to the
crime of drunk driving; (3) the condition subjected him to undue
public ridicule and unreasonably interfered with his right to se-
lect a community in which to live; and (4) the condition "was
arbitrary and capricious because it treated similarly situated
offenders disproportionately."95 The appeals court emphatically
rejected Lindsay's first argument that the requirement violated
the rehabilitative purpose of probation, stating:
We think that [Lindsay] assumes too much. Deciding that
the primary purpose of probation is rehabilitation is not the
same thing as making probation free from any punitive ef-
fect. Rehabilitation and punishment are not mutually exclu-
sive ideas. They can co-exist in any single, particular conse-
quence of a conviction without robbing one another of effect.
In fact, it is difficult to imagine any condition of probation
that does not have some punitive aspect to it.96
The appeals court thus acknowledged the nexus between pun-
ishment and probation. Moreover, the court noted that Florida
91. 606 So. 2d 652 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
92. See id at 652.
93. See id. at 653.
94. See id
95. Ido at 655. Lindsay also argued that the condition of probation prevented him
from exercising his right not to speak. See id
96. Id at 656.
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law permits a trial judge to sentence an offender to incarceration
as a condition of probation and stated that "[i]ncarceration is
surely one of the clearest expressions of punishment and, if ap-
pellant were correct in his essential premise, entirely antitheti-
cal to the purely rehabilitational purpose of probation."97 The
court did not, however, go so far as to characterize the probation
condition at issue as strictly punitive. While such a condition
may be overwhelmingly punitive with a modicum of rehabilita-
tive aspects, classifying the condition as exclusively punitive
clearly would place it outside the framework of probation as
specified by the Florida statute.9"
As for Lindsay's second argument that the probation condition
bore no relationship to the crime charged, the appeals court de-
ferred to the trial judge, who had the ultimate responsibility of
determining the relationship between criminal conduct and ap-
propriate probationary requirements. 99 The appeals court af-
firmed the trial court judge's "breathtaking" discretion and cre-
ative flexibility in imposing conditions of probation.0 0
The appeals court addressed Lindsay's third argument by not-
ing the inherent contradiction with his second rationale for re-
versal.' °' Lindsay asserted that the sentence bore no relation to
the crime and simultaneously argued that the sentence subject-
ed him to ridicule and humiliation.0 2 The court stated "[tihere is
an inherent irony that the stronger he makes the case for humil-
iation and ridicule, the more he tacitly concedes that [the pun-
ishment] is reasonably appropriate to its penal ends."10 3 Ulti-
mately, the court found no reason to reject the lower court's be-
lief that the newspaper advertisement served putative rehabil-
itative purposes. 1°4
Finally, the appeals court dispensed with Lindsay's contention
that the punishment was arbitrary and capricious by noting the
97. Id.
98. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 948.01(3)(b) (West 1996) (stating that probation should
serve to rehabilitate the offender and protect the community).
99. See Lindsay, 606 So. 2d at 657.
100. See id. at 655.
101. See id at 657.
102. See id.
103. Id.
104. See id
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flexibility of sentencing guidelines." 5 The court emphasized that
the sentencing guidelines provided judges with discretion in sen-
tencing offenders.1"6 This discretion both permitted individual-
ized punishment and justified the inherent, but not unreason-
able, discrepancies in sentencing DUI offenders. 107
DOES SHAMING PASS EIGHTH AMENDMENT MUSTER?
As described above, appellate courts frequently have struck
down shaming as a form of probation on the ground that it
amounts to an abuse of judicial discretion.' These courts gener-
ally reason that probation, as defined by statute, is meant to
rehabilitate, whereas shaming constitutes a form of punish-
ment.10 9 Some states have determined that any form of proba-
tion incorporating punitive aspects not enumerated in a statuto-
ry list of acceptable probation conditions should be struck down
as an abuse of judicial discretion."0
The purpose of this Note is not to question the formulation of
the goals and acceptable limitations of probation as a part of
state legislative decisionmaking. States are free to incorporate
probation as a means of returning offenders to public life or al-
lowing such individuals to avoid prison altogether."' Additional-
ly, it is probably wise that states have limited the ability of
judges to impose harsh conditions of probation. Absent a check
on the judiciary, probation conditions might become tainted with
dangerous vindictiveness and vigilantism.
Characterizing shame as probation, however, essentially pre-
cludes its imposition as a judicial technique to handle offenders
105. See id at 658.
106. See id.
107. See i& (noting that the legislative intent of the Florida statute was to give
judges flexibility to consider the facts of each case and the probability of recidivism).
108. See supra text accompanying notes 45-90.
109. See People v. Meyer, 680 N.E.2d 315, 318 (Ill. 1997); People v. Letterlough,
655 N.E.2d 146, 149 (N.Y. 1995); see also State v. Burdin, 924 S.W.2d 82, 85-86
(Tenn. 1996) (affirming the theory that probation should work to rehabilitate the
offender).
110. See, e.g., Meyer, 680 N.E.2d at 320; Burdin, 924 S.W.2d at 87.
111. See generally Meyer, 680 N.E.2d at 318 (noting the repeated recognition by
courts that probation, as opposed to incarceration, is designed to rehabilitate offenders).
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in states that place restrictions on probation." 2 Consequently,
banning shame-based probation removes an effective judicial
response to offenders who do not deserve jail, but would be bet-
ter served by something with more import than simple proba-
tion.113
The most obvious solution to this problem is for judges simply
to refuse to characterize shame as probation and, alternatively,
to start calling it "punishment." By defining shame as pun-
ishment, society places less importance on the probation-
ary/rehabilitative aspects of shaming and instead focuses on the
moral and social condemnation inherent in such a sanction. 4 In
practice, shame punishment is likely to have more rehabilitative
effect than punitive effect. 5 This is not detrimental. Ultimately,
shame punishment is good for society because it allows offenders
to return to productive lives without the stigma of prison on
their records, and it provides the public with some tangible evi-
dence that the offenders are paying their debts to society. 6
Defining the imposition of shame as punishment rather than
probation is not a mere matter of semantics. There are two hur-
dles that must be cleared before an attempt to institute shaming
as a common form of punishment can become meaningful. First,
legislatures must modify sentencing guidelines to allow for
shame punishment. State sentencing guidelines impose limits on
judicial discretion that are, at the appellate level, equally as fa-
tal to shame punishment as the limits placed on probation. 7
112. See iL at 320 (striking down the lower court's sentence as inconsistent with
statutory provisions outlining the permissible forms of probation).
113. Cf a at 319-20 (striking down the trial judge's creative attempt to rehabili-
tate an offender because the punishment was outside the confines of acceptable pro-
bationary measures).
114. See generally Stephen P. Garvey, Can Shaming Punishments Educate?, 65 U.
CHi. L. REV. 733, 744 (1998) (arguing that shaming penalties "express moral con-
demnation of the offender's conduct").
115. See Lindsay v. State, 606 So. 2d 652, 658 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992) (noting
that publicizing convictions may reduce recidivism in DUI offenders).
116. Limitations on the imposition of shame punishments and their combination
with probationary aspects such as community service are essential elements of any
shame punishment program that a judge may wish to implement. See infra text ac-
companying notes 183-205.
117. See, e.g., 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 5/5-5-3 (West 1993) (prescribing manda-
tory sentencing guidelines).
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Amending state sentencing guidelines to permit shaming will
clear the way for judges to exercise their creativity without fear
of reversal on statutory grounds.
While amending state sentencing guidelines is simply a mat-
ter of legislative initiative, the second barrier to the legal accep-
tance of shame punishment is much more substantial. Classify-
ing shame as punishment carries significant constitutional im-
plications that could either limit its imposition or sound the
death knell for such punishment altogether. To firmly imbed it-
self in the judicial arsenal, shame punishment must pass one of
the primary constitutional gatekeepers of American criminal jus-
tice-the Eighth Amendment."'
To a reasonable person, requiring an offender to wear a sand-
wich board and parade around the courthouse may appear to be
an unusual form of punishment."' To some it also might seem
slightly cruel. 2 ° Application of the Court's Eighth Amendment
analysis shows, however, that such punishment would pass con-
stitutional scrutiny.'2 ' This analysis is best shown by examining
shame punishment in the light of corporal punishment.
Constitutional Corporal Punishment
The Eighth Amendment prohibits the government from impos-
ing cruel and unusual punishments.'22 In Trop v. Dulles,'23 the
Supreme Court set forth the modern interpretation of the Eighth
Amendment.'24 The Court stated that the meaning of the Eighth
Amendment must be drawn from "the evolving standards of de-
118. See U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (prohibiting the infliction of "cruel and unusual
punishment").
119. See Dan M. Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean?, 63 U. CHI. L. REV.
591, 646 (1996).
120. See, e.g., Whitman, supra note 13, at 1058.
121. Cf infra text accompanying notes 129-34 (discussing the constitutionality of
corporal punishment as an analog to that of shame punishment).
122. See U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
123. 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
124. See id. at 104; Roberta M. Harding, The Gallows to the Gurney: Analyzing the
(Un)constitutionality of the Methods of Executions, 6 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 153, 160
(1996) (stating that Trop forms the basis of modern Eighth Amendment jurispru-
dence).
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cency that mark the progress of a maturing society." 125 No subse-
quent Supreme Court decision has seriously challenged the Trop
standard. 26 Under the "dignity of man" standard articulated in
Trop, 12 some argue that shame punishment would be unconsti-
tutional under the Eighth Amendment. 121 Although the Court
has never ruled directly on this issue, an examination of Su-
preme Court jurisprudence regarding corporal punishment re-
veals that shame punishment likely would be upheld when sub-
jected to an Eighth Amendment challenge. If the court were to
uphold corporal punishment as constitutional under the Eighth
Amendment, it arguably would find shame punishment to be
constitutional as well. 29
Corporal punishment is the infliction of physical pain on a
convicted criminal in lieu of, or in addition to, a prison
sentence. 30 Although the modern criminal justice system does
not use corporal punishment, 3' the Supreme Court has never
found corporal punishment to rise to the level of cruel and un-
usual punishment.
32
125. Trop, 356 U.S. at 101.
126. See, e.g., Atiyeh v. Capps, 449 U.S. 1312, 1315 (1981) (criticizing the district
court's reliance on Trop as merely a plurality decision).
127. See Trop, 356 U.S. at 100.
128. See, e.g., Jon A. Brilliant, Note, The Modern Day Scarlet Letter: A Critical
Analysis of Modern Probation Conditions, 1989 DUKE L.J. 1357. In a well-written
note attacking the use of shame as a form of probation, Brilliant criticizes shame-
type probation as improper and unconstitutional in the modem civilized world ac-
cording to the dignity of man standard articulated in Trop. See id at 1381-83. His
argument is not without merit, as courts could find some types of shame punish-
ments excessive under the Supreme Court's standard. As this Note will show, how-
ever, certain types of shame punishments are more effective and more humane than
sending the offender off to prison, because shame punishment provides a solution
that will likely return that offender to society with more dignity than would alterna-
tive punishments. See infra text accompanying notes 185-200. Such a system of care-
fully doled out shame punishments is eminently more civilized than the alternatives
of meaningless probation or brutalizing incarceration.
129. Cf GRAEIE NEWMAN, JUST AND PAINFUL: A CASE FOR THE CORPORAL PUNISH-
iENT OF CRIMINALS 11, 22 (Harrow & Heston 2d ed. 1995) (1983) (noting that an
element of humiliation or shaming is a part of all corporal punishments).
130. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 339 (6th ed. 1990).
131. See NEWMAN, supra note 129, at 9-13. Newman sets forth a compelling argu-
ment for implementing corporal punishment of criminals. His preferred' method is
electric shock treatments. See id at 56-65. Newman received much criticism for his
ideas; he even admitted to being called a "latter-day Menghele" by one penologist.
Id. at 3.
132. See Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 683 (1977). Further, in State v. Cannon,
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There would not be much debate concerning corporal punish-
ment in the United States had it not been for the 1994 caning of
an American youth charged with vandalism in Singapore. 3 s The
incident prompted Justice Scalia to predict that corporal punish-
ment likely would survive an Eighth Amendment challenge if
the issue ever were brought before the U.S. Supreme Court.
134
Assuming Justice Scalia is correct, and that corporal punish-
ment would indeed pass Eighth Amendment muster, it stands to
reason that shame punishment would pass such a standard as
well. Shame punishment is less severe than corporal punish-
ment. No measurable physical pain is inflicted on the offend-
er-which indicates that the punishment is not cruel-nor is the
offender subject to anything but temporary and mild emotional
distress. Such distress presumably is far less than would be ex-
perienced if the offender were forced to serve a prison sentence.
Shame punishment also is not unusual. It is, rather, a cre-
ative alternative to traditional, and arguably ineffective, modes
of punishment that draws its essence from American historical
tradition, and has reemerged in a less severe and more effective
form.
DOES SHAMING WORK?
Regardless of whether shame punishments would survive an
Eighth Amendment challenge or any other judicial analysis,
courts should not impose such punishments unless there is some
probability that they will rehabilitate criminal offenders. If such
punishments do not work, implementing them would be a waste
of judicial time and resources, and would result in placing a con-
victed offender in a position where he could offend again. While
there is no empirical data analyzing the effectiveness of shaming
190 A.2d 514 (Del. 1963), the Delaware Supreme Court dismissed the notion that
the Eighth Amendment prevented corporal punishment of criminals. See id. at 518.
In fact, Delaware did not abolish corporal punishment formally until 1974. See
HIRSCH, supra note 30, at 136 n.88 (stating that Delaware was the last state to
abolish corporal punishment through DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4205 (1974)).
133. See William Branigan, Singapore Canes American Teenager; Clinton Calls
Punishment 'A Mistake,' WASH. POST, May 6, 1994, at A27.
134. See Justice Scalia Says Caning Likely Constitutional, S.F. CHRON., May 7,
1994, at Al, available in LEXIS, News Library, Papers file.
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as punishment, there is evidence that shaming is an effective
and creative means of keeping some offenders out of the prison
system while simultaneously giving them a chance at rehabilita-
tion.'35 This evidence takes on two forms.
First, the psychological literature indicates that shaming
works. From a psychological perspective, shaming shapes behav-
ior from childhood to adulthood.13 6 Because shaming affects hu-
mans at a clinical, psychological level, it could work on the pu-
nitive level. 3 ' Second, a more common-sense approach posits
that, because the prison system is not effectively solving the
crime problem in America, society must explore alternatives that
give offenders a chance at changing their ways without subject-
ing them to an environment that only can reinforce their crimi-
nal behavior. These two perspectives will be the focus of this
section.
The Psychological Aspect: Shame is Good
In general, one can assume that people have an aversion to-
ward the commission of crime."8 In contemporary society, there
are more law-abiding people than criminals.'39 "People comply
with the law most of the time not through fear of punishment,
or even fear of shaming, but because criminal behavior is simply
abhorrent to them."'40 The development of an anti-crime attitude
by the majority of the population originates with shaming early
in life.141
Almost everyone, at one time or another, must face some type
of shame punishment. Many parents punish their children's sim-
ple transgressions with spankings, lectures, and banishment to
the child's room so the child can reflect on his or her conduct."
Such simple shaming techniques are the foundation of con-
135. See BRAITHWAITr , supra note 24, at 179-81.
136. See id- at 56-58.
137. See id at 73.
138. See id at 71.
139. See id.
140. Id.
141. See icL
142. See id
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science, shaping human attitudes toward the unthinkableness of
crime." Parental shaming techniques are effective in that they
serve to ingrain an automatic anxiety response in the individual
that continues into adulthood.144
Verbal shaming frequently accompanies physical shame pun-
ishment. Parents often tell children that they are "bad" or
"naughty" for doing something wrong. "This verbal labeling is
the key to a process of generalization that groups together a va-
riety of types of misbehavior... that all elicit conditioned anxi-
ety; in time the generalization proceeds further, with the more
abstract concept of 'crime' being defined as 'naughty' or 'evil."145
If one accepts this argument, one also would be likely to accept
the further assertion that conscience is a trait acquired through
a variety of shaming techniques imposed in differing degrees by
the family throughout the developmental process of the child. 46
As an individual progresses to adulthood, the specter of paren-
tal shame tends to diminish as the more powerful adult human
conscience takes over to control actions.44 As John Braithwaite
describes:
In the wider society, it is no longer logistically possible, as
it is in the nursery, for arrangements to be made for punish-
ment to hang over the heads of persons whenever temptation
to break the rules is put in their path. ... Unlike any pun-
ishment handed down by the courts, the anxiety response
happens without delay, indeed punishment by anxiety pre-
cedes the rewards obtained from the crime, while any punish-
ment by law will follow long after the reward. For most of
us, punishment by our own conscience is therefore a much
more potent threat than punishment by the criminal justice
system. 148
For most individuals, therefore, shame and conscience are in-
extricably intertwined both to deter crime and to impose a self-
143. See id- at 71-72.
144. See ic. at 72.
145. Id at 71.
146. See generally id (tracing the emergence of human conscience).
147. See id at 71-72.
148. Id
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penalty on those who commit crimes.149 There are, however,
those who commit crimes despite the existence of conscience.'
50
The conscience of those individuals may have failed with respect
to their criminal acts.151 In these circumstances, shame punish-
ment has the greatest potential effect.'52 "[Sihaming can be a re-
affirmation of the morality of the offender by expressing person-
al disappointment that the offender should do something so out
of character. . . 2 5' Braithwaite discusses the differences be-
tween punishment and shaming:
Punishment erects barriers between the offender and
punisher through transforming the relationship into one of
power assertion and injury; shaming produces a greater in-
terconnectedness between the parties, albeit a painful one, an
interconnectedness which can produce the repulsion of stig-
matization or the establishment of a potentially more positive
relationship following integration. Punishment is often
shameful and shaming usually punishes. But whereas pun-
ishment gets its symbolic content only from its denunciatory
association with shaming, shaming is pure symbolic con-
tent.15
4
Shame can function as both an effective punishment of crimi-
nals and a tool for the rehabilitation of offenders. 55 It can be a
powerful tool indeed, but only in a society that has a need for it
and wields it properly.
149. There are those individuals who simply have no conscience and for whom the
shaming process is ineffective. See id at 73. These individuals, known as psycho-
paths, for some reason have missed the conditioning step afforded to most people
and neither shame, conscience, nor punishment is likely to deter them from the com-
mission of crime. See id.
150. See id
151. In these circumstances, which befall all of us from time to time, Braithwaite
points out that "we need a refresher course in the consequences of a compromised
conscience." Id at 72.
152. See i&
153. Id
154. Id at 73.
155. See id. at 72-73.
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The Need for Shaming
The previous section presented arguments demonstrating that
shaming as a form of punishment works to rehabilitate criminal
offenders. The question that remains is whether shaming pun-
ishment is necessary. Shaming is a rational and evidently much
needed alternative to the traditional choice of prison and proba-
tion.'56 Many Americans have lost confidence in the criminal
justice system: a 1997 Gallup Poll indicated that forty percent of
Americans have "very little" or no confidence in the system.
1 57
Only twenty percent had "a great deal [or] quite a lot" of confi-
dence.' These numbers are a disturbing comment on criminal
justice, especially considering that Americans ranked crime and
violence as the most important problems facing the country.'
Similarly, Americans have lost faith in their state prison sys-
tems: in 1996, over seventy-four percent of Americans had only
"some" or "very little" confidence in their state prisons. 60
America's opinion of the probation system is equally low. In
response to suggestions to reduce prison overcrowding, only
slightly more than twenty percent of Americans believed that
parole boards should be given more authority to release offend-
ers early.'6 ' Less than sixteen percent felt that regular probation
supervision was "very effective" as an alternative to prison. 62
156. See supra notes 135-55 and accompanying text.
157. See SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS, supra note 18, at 118 tbl.
2.9. Those polled were asked "I am going to read you a list of institutions in Ameri-
can Society. Please tell me how much confidence you, yourself, have in each one-a
great deal, quite a lot, some, or very little: the criminal justice system?" Id-
158. See id
159. See id. at 114 tbl.2.1. In 1997, 23% of Americans ranked crime/violence as the
most critical problem facing the country. See id& Americans ranked the economy
(21%), poverty (10%), and education (10%) as less important problems facing the
country. See id.
160. See id at 124 tbl.2.16. Less then 8% of Americans had "a great deal" of con-
fidence in the state prison system. I&
161. See i& at 156 tbl.2.61. Other suggestions that garnered significantly more sup-
port included good behavior and work-release (63.2%), local programs designed to
help first-time offenders (89.2%), and increasing taxes to build more prisons (31.4%).
See id.
162. See i& at 159 tbl.2.64. This poll asked Americans to rate various alternatives
to incarceration in order to reduce prison overcrowding. See id These alternatives
included electronic monitoring, home confinement, boot camps, and community service.
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Between 1980 and 1993, the United States increased per capita
expenditures for the criminal justice system by more than
308%.163 During that same period, state governments increased
their direct expenditures on correctional institutions by over
368%.164 As evidenced by their dissatisfaction with the prison
system,165 Americans perceive that they are getting less for their
tax dollar. To highlight the frustration Americans feel, in 1996,
sixty-seven percent of Americans indicated that they thought
government allocated too few funds to halt the rising crime rate
effectively.
166
America, therefore, needs alternatives to a prison system per-
ceived as ineffective in preventing crime and rehabilitating of-
fenders. The data show that many Americans would favor alter-
natives to prison, such as shaming.161 Over eighty-nine percent
of people polled favored the imposition of local programs that
would keep nonviolent and first-time offenders out of prison and
permit them to remain active members of their communities. 6 s
While the poll did not specifically mention shaming, such pun-
ishments would fall within the definition specified by the poll-
sters because an essential feature of these punishments or
programs is to permit offenders to remain part of their com-
munity.1
69
Shame punishment is a particularly attractive option consid-
ering the number of nonviolent offenders in the criminal justice
See a Unfortunately, this poll, conducted by the Survey Research Program at the
College of Criminal Justice, Sam Houston State University, did not include the im-
position of shame punishments as an option. See id-
163. See id. at 10 tbl.1.7. The increase was from $30.37 per person to $123.93 per
person. See i&L
164. See id& at 11 tbl.1.9. Direct expenditures increased from over $3.4 billion to
over $15.9 billion. See id "Correctional institutions are prisons, reformatories, jails,
houses of correction, penitentiaries, correctional farms, work-houses, reception centers,
diagnostic centers, industrial schools, training schools, detention centers, and a vari-
ety of other types of institutions for the confinement and correction of convicted
adults or juveniles ... ." Id at 592 (emphasis omitted).
165. See supra text accompanying notes 157-60.
166. See SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS, supra note 18, at 142-43
tbl.2.43.
167. See id at 156 tbl.2.61.
168. See id
169. See id
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system. In 1993, for example, the U.S. district courts convicted
53,435 defendants. 7 ° Of these, only 3,077, or 5.76%, were found
guilty of committing violent offenses. 7' The rest were convicted
of nonviolent offenses.'72 This is not to say that all nonviolent
offenders would be suitable for shame punishment. The candi-
date pool is very large and there are presumably thousands who
would benefit from nontraditional punishments.
173
Consider that over 20,000 of the total convictions in U.S. dis-
trict courts mentioned above were for drug-related charges. 74
Another 13,000 or more were for offenses such as bribery, perju-
ry, liquor, gambling, and weapons offenses. 75 Moreover, out of
the total of those convicted, almost 19,000, or 48.2%, had no pri-
or criminal record. 176 Pending some basic evaluation at the trial
court level, many of these individuals might be ideal candidates
for shame punishment because of the nonviolent nature of their
crimes.
The American public is frustrated with the current criminal
justice system, which it perceives as ineffective. 177 This is true
despite skyrocketing budgets devoted to that system. 78 The vast
majority of the population favors some type of alternative pun-
ishment that would keep first-time offenders out of prison and,
hopefully, create productive and law-abiding citizens. 79 The pris-
on population consists of primarily nonviolent offenders. 80 Of
170. See id at 440 tbl.5.19.
171. See id- Violent felonies included murder, negligent manslaughter, assault, rob-
bery, rape, other sex offenses, kidnapping, and threats against the President. See ida
172. See id Nonviolent offenses included embezzlement, fraud, burglary, larceny,
drug offenses, tax violations, gambling and liquor offenses, bribery, perjury, and mo-
tor vehicle theft. See idL
173. See id; see also Shame as Punishment, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, May 2, 1998, at
A14, available in 1998 WL 8327517 (noting that of all offenders ordered to undergo
shame punishment by Texas judges, only two were arrested again).
174. See SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS, supra note 18, at 440
tbl.5.19.
175. See idc
176. See id at 441 tbl.5.20. This includes violent offenses. See idi
177. See supra notes 157-60 and accompanying text.
178. See SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS, supra note 18, at 10-11
tbls.1.7, 1.8, 1.9.
179. See supra note 168 and accompanying text.
180. See supra notes 171-72 and accompanying text.
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these, many are first-time offenders.181 Subjecting these offend-
ers to shame punishment instead of incarceration may prevent
them from becoming recidivists.8 2
THE BOUNDARIES OF SHAME
The role shaming will assume in the American criminal jus-
tice system is contingent upon its future success. The future of
shaming depends upon imposing shaming sentences within cer-
tain substantive boundaries upon offenders who are good candi-
dates for rehabilitation. It should be emphasized that shaming is
not a panacea for the criminal justice system. Courts should ad-
minister shame sentences selectively and sensibly, and tailor
them appropriately to the offender. While this Note argues that
judges should be given a great deal of discretion when imple-
menting shame punishment, there are limits that legislatures
and appellate courts should put into place in order to curb the
actions of over-creative and over-zealous judges who attempt to
push shaming to the extreme. What follows is a discussion of
recommended limitations.
The Truly Bizarre
Some judges have imposed shame punishment that is entirely
too extreme. One judge in Tennessee permitted the victims of a
burglary to enter the home of the convicted burglar and steal an
item.8 3 While such punishment is novel and somewhat humor-
ous, it crosses the boundary of acceptable punishment. In es-
sence, the Tennessee judge punished the offender by permitting
a court-sanctioned commission of a crime. This eye-for-an-eye
mentality has never been the basis of the American criminal
justice system and it sends the wrong message to the public.'84
Additionally, judges may impose shame punishment that is
ineffective because it does not shame enough. In the Tennessee
case, the criminal did not face public scorn for his actions, nor
181. See supra note 176 and accompanying text.
182. See Shame as Punishment, supra note 173, at A14.
183. See Allen-Mills, supra note 11, at 23
184. See HIRSCH, supra note 30, at xi.
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did permitting the victims to steal an item from the criminal's
house have a particularly strong impact on the criminal. Effec-
tive shame punishment takes away the potential benefits the
criminal might have realized from the crime.
Shame punishment should be limited to circumstances that
clearly subject the offender to public shame. Judges should not
impose a punishment that involves the commission of another
crime. In addition, judges should not impose any shame pun-
ishment that sanctions interaction with the victim of the crime.
Involving the victim of a crime in criminal punishment sends a
dangerous endorsement of vigilantism from the bench."8 5 Crimi-
nal punishment should involve only the justice system. Victims,
while they deserve compassion and compensation, should not
participate in the imposition of criminal punishment.
Consistency
Recently, local governments and judges have shown their in-
genuity in meting out shame punishment.'86 Such creativity ben-
efits society in that it allows the judge to formulate a shame
sentence that truly fits the crime. In many cases, the circum-
stances of a crime are such that a certain type of shame punish-
ment would not be suitable. By requiring a convicted drunk
driver to affix a sign to his license plate in People v.
Letterlough,"'8 the court provided an excellent example of a form
of shame punishment that clearly related to the crime. The sign
on the license plate sufficiently warned other drivers that
Letterlough had been convicted of driving while intoxicated and
that they should use caution while driving near him. In con-
185. See generally Timothy Lenz, Republican Virtue and the American Vigilante, 12
LEGAL STUD. F. 117, 126 (1988) (recognizing that some legal theorists view vigilan-
tism as an undesirable feature of human nature that society may prevent by legal
order).
186. In New York City, for example, police issued a deli owner a $1,000 ticket for
chaining his bicycle to a tree. See Pete Bowles, 'Tree Abuser' Apologizes; Rudy Says
It's Not Enough, NEWSDAY (N.Y.), Apr. 3, 1998, available in LEXIS, News Library,
Papers File. In lieu of the fine, the Parks Commissioner offered the owner amnesty
if he apologized to the tree and hugged it. See id The deli owner gladly accepted
the shame punishment saying, "I hugged the tree 20 times today and I kissed it
too." Id Mayor Rudolph Giuliani said that a judge should review the matter. See id2
187. 655 N.E.2d 146 (N.Y. 1995).
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trast, had the judge required Letterlough to wear a T-shirt with
the words "CONVICTED DWI" on it and parade in front of the
courthouse, Letterlough undoubtedly would have suffered
shame, but the punishment would have had little relation to the
crime. The sign would warn only pedestrians of his tendency to
drink and drive, and those pedestrians would be unlikely to
identify Letterlough while he was in his car.
In Houston, Judge Ted Poe took an even firmer stance against
drunk driving. Judge Poe ordered a man convicted of intoxicated
manslaughter, in addition to serving a prison term, to attend
110 days of boot camp, erect a memorial at the scene of the acci-
dent, carry a sign proclaiming his crime, speak to school stu-
dents about the perils of drunk driving, and observe an autopsy
of a victim of drunk driving. 8 '
The punishment prescribed by the New York court in
Letterlough was appropriate for the crime charged. While se-
vere, the sentence prescribed by Judge Poe was appropriate giv-
en the nature of the crime. Judges from the state should subject
future offenders convicted of the same crime to a similar form of
punishment. Sentences imposed for virtually equivalent crimes
should not be grossly disproportionate. While shame sentences
may vary in manner, style, and severity, they should not differ
so much as to raise procedural or substantive due process is-
sues.'89 It would be relatively simple for judges to maintain con-
sistency in sentencing through basic computer record-keeping.
Type of Criminal
Some criminals are better suited for shaming than others. 9 °
As a general proposition, shaming should apply only to nonvio-
lent offenders because there is a strong correlation between
shame and anger or rage.' 9 ' To force a violent offender to under-
188. See Julia Duin, Perpetrators Sentenced to Humiliation in Texas: Judge Orders
'90s Version of Scarlet Letter, WASH. TIMES, Sept. 5, 1998, at Al.
189. See generally Courtney Guyton Persons, Note, Sex in the Sunlight: The Effec-
tiveness, Efficiency, Constitutionality, and Advisability of Publishing Names and Pic-
tures of Prostitutes' Patrons, 49 VAND. L. REV. 1525, 1554-57 (1996) (discussing the
due process issues implicated by shaming prostitutes and their clients).
190. See BRAITHWAITE, supra note 24, at 73.
191. See MICHAEL LEWIS, SHAME: THE EXPOSED SELF 149-55 (1992). Lewis discuss-
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go public humiliation likely would lead to more violence. 92 Al-
though shaming may be suitable for a select few violent offend-
ers, 1a3 the risk to the public is too great. Prison is a better option
for violent criminals.' 94 For other, nonviolent offenders, the
judge, as the primary fact finder, is in the best position to deter-
mine whether the individual is a suitable candidate for shame
punishment.
Judges should not use shame punishment across the board.
The judge should evaluate a variety of criteria, including wit-
ness testimony, prior dealings with the offender, and the presen-
tence investigation report prepared by a probation officer to de-
termine whether the offender can handle a sentence of shame or
whether incarceration is a better alternative.
The consequences of failing to evaluate properly a potential
candidate for shame punishment could be dreadful.'95 Consider
the case of a man convicted of drunk driving in Georgia."' As a
condition of his sentence, the judge required that a photograph
of the man appear in the county's local newspaper, which served
es the consequences of shame when imposed on individuals who exhibit what is
called the "shame-rage spiral." Id& at 153. Lewis distinguishes between simple anger
and dangerous rage by stating-
Anger is a simple bodily response, whereas rage is a process, moving
from shame to rage in alternative spiral fashion. Anger feels justified,
whereas in rage one feels powerless. Injury is recognized in anger, but
injury is denied in rage. Anger is conscious, whereas rage, based on
shame substitution, is pushed from awareness. While anger may be easily
resolved, rage, initiated by shame, sets up a feeling trap.... Anger re-
suts in a few negative consequences, and rage results in many.... Fi-
nally, anger appears bounded, that is, there is a way to resolve it;
whereas rage itself may be unbounded.
Id-
192. See id
193. There should be a general presumption that violent offenders are not suitable
for shaming. Some violent offenders, however, are not a risk to the public at-large.
For example, an individual convicted of an assault charge for a barroom fight is un-
likely to be a danger to society unless he has been drinking in a bar. In addition to
alcohol counseling, such an offender is an ideal candidate for shame punishment. In
every case, however, the sentencing judge should take the individual characteristics
of the offender into account before imposing a shame punishment in lieu of jail time.
This is essential in the case of violent criminals.
194. See BRAITHWAITE, supra note 24, at 73.
195. See Woolner, supra note 2, at 3.
196. See id
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as the town's legal organ.197 The man had not told his mother,
with whom he lived, of the conviction.198 By chance, she saw his
picture in the newspaper and left her son a note on the kitchen
table telling him of her shame that he was convicted of the
crime. 9 9 Distraught and embarrassed after reading the note, the
man committed suicide.200 Judges could avoid such tragedies by
evaluating the type of individual to determine if he or she is a
suitable candidate for shame punishment.
Voluntariness
Another means to avoid the above-mentioned tragedy is to
make shame penalties voluntary. It is likely that, presented
with a choice between shame and prison, many offenders would
choose the former and avoid prison at all costs. 20 1 In some cases,
however, the offender might have reasons to choose prison over
shame. It is better to let the offender serve a prison sentence
than to risk the type of tragedy that occurred in Georgia." 2 In
that case, the ultimate self-imposed punishment certainly did
not fit the crime. As a condition of all shame punishment, judges
should offer offenders an option of either receiving the tradition-
al punishment of incarceration or a shame punishment. Judges
should make the offender fully aware of the requirements of the
shame punishment before sentencing so that the offender can
make an informed judgment.
Combining Shame with Service
In every case possible, judges should combine shame punish-
ment with some utilitarian aspect.20 While requiring an individ-
ual to parade around a courthouse satisfies society from a retrib-
197. See id
198. See id
199. See id.
200. See id
201. See supra notes 6-8 and accompanying text.
202. See supra text accompanying notes 196-200.
203. See Michael Grunwald, Shame Makes Comeback in Court; Texas Judge Likes
to Impose Public Punishment for Crime, ARiZ. REPUBLIC, Jan. 11, 1998, at A14,
available in 1998 WL 7742935.
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utive standpoint because the public can see punishment at work,
it is nonproductive. Whenever possible, therefore, judges should
couple shaming with some sort of community service. In the case
of the man required to march around with a sandwich board, °4
he also should have to pick up garbage around the courthouse
and surrounding streets. In the case of the drunk driver re-
quired to affix a sign to his license plate, the court should re-
quire the offender to inform others, possibly newly licensed driv-
ers, about the dangers of drunk driving." 5 Requiring some sort
of community service as a part of shaming serves several pur-
poses. It furthers the shaming process by ensuring that the com-
munity is able to protect itself from dangerous offenders and it
makes potential offenders aware of the consequences of their
acts. Mandatory community service also forces the offender to
give something back to the community that he or she has dis-
turbed, although in a different form.
CONCLUSION
The American criminal justice system should embrace shame
as an effective means of punishing offenders. The current prob-
lems of overcrowding in America's prisons and soaring budgets
that have reached their limits require that state and federal leg-
islatures, as well as courts, implement creative alternatives to
incarceration. Shaming is likely to work in appropriate cases
and under the proper circumstances. The psychology of shame
shows that it is a powerful tool in shaping behavior throughout
an individual's lifetime. Reinforcing an offender's recognition of
the wrongness of his deeds through shaming is a way to prevent
future crime. Shaming punishment sets an example for others
and provides the public with a tangible sense of justice in action.
Aaron S. Book
204. See supra notes 2-8 and accompanying text.
205. This can be accomplished through court-required lectures, or attendance at Al-
coholics Anonymous meetings.
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